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Professional liability or malpractice is nothing more than a violation of a minimally appropriate standard of care which results in
harm to the client-the public customer. The appropriate standard of care reflects the particular profession's skills, services,
training, and daily work activity and incorporates practical experience, ethics, honor codes, federal law, state law, and the rules of
self-regulatory organizations (SRO's) such as the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). The warp and woof for these standards is undeniably the democratic community from which they develop.
When a lawyer or accountant is sued for violation of a minimally appropriate standard of care governing his or her profession,
it is said to be a malpractice claim. The professional status of lawyers and accountants is well established. Claims against securities
brokers, however, are often viewed differently, in large part because public perceptions have not yet fixed upon brokers a professional status comparable to the legal and accounting professions.
Nonetheless, federal law, state law, and SRO rules clearly set forth
minimally appropriate standards of practice for the securities industry and investor community. Thus, securities brokers are effectively professionals (whether the public recognizes it or not), and
brokers should be viewed as having professional status. The claims
asserted against brokers for harmful acts and omissions are, in reality, if not by name, securities broker malpractice. These claims
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neled into the SRO arbitration forum. It is therefore crucial to
define and understand securities broker malpractice and develop,
for the public customer and broker alike, a strategy for its avoidance. Significant responsibilities attach when one is entrusted to
invest and take risks with another's money. These responsibilities,
along with concern for the safety and soundness of our capital markets, mandate that we hold securities brokers and securities organizations to realistic and clearly defined professional standards; that
we fully develop arbitration as a cost-effective means of claims resolution; that we continually improve the rules and standards of care
to avoid investment losses, claims, and litigation expenses; and,
most significantly, that we increase the awareness and understanding of the standards of care governing the securities industry and
investor community.
This article will review, in the first instance, some typical
claims for securities broker's malpractice; second, we will discuss
the supervisory rules that create organizational liability against the
broker-dealer firm; third, we will discuss the arbitration forum, its
basic rules, and unique culture; and finally, we will detail a strategy
of malpractice avoidance and the defense of securities claims.
I.

SECURITIES BROKER'S MALPRACTICE

Securities brokers, like other professionals, are subject to numerous claims for malpractice. A typical and frequently asserted
claim is that the broker has engaged in unauthorized trading. This
article will focus on two other important and frequently asserted,
but often misunderstood, claims: (1) churning, and (2) the claim
that unsuitable securities have been purchased for a customer's account (in light of the customer's objectives, financial capacity, and
needs).
A.

Churning

Churning occurs when a broker, exercising control over the volume and frequency of trading, abuses his customer's confidence
for personal gain by initiating transactions that are excessive in
view of the character of the account. Its hallmarks are disproportionate turnover, frequent in and out trading, and large brokerage commissions.'
Put more simply, churning occurs when a broker (1) controls an
account and (2) trades excessively either in volume or frequency.
I Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975).
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Although authorities are split, a third element may apply to churning claims requiring proof the broker acted (3) either intentionally
to defraud or acted willfully and recklessly in disregard of the customer's
interests. Transactions which generate commissions for the salesperson but do not serve the interests of the customer are strictly
prohibited. To determine if churning has occurred, one must analyze the overall trading in an account, rather than focus on particular transactions.2
1.

Control

The first element of a churning claim is control. A churning
claim must include a showing that the broker controlled the customer's account. Proof of control, or a demonstration that the
broker possessed discretionary authority to make trading decisions
for the account, is required to establish the causal link between the
actions of the broker and the plaintiffs losses.' A broker who acts
merely as an order taker and completes the customer's injudicious
orders does not have control and probably has not acted dishonestly or unethically.4
Control may be express, implied, or even inferred from the
relationship between the broker and customer. If the customer
has executed a written discretionary account agreement which authorizes the broker to make the investment and trading decisions
on behalf of the customer without prior consultation the element
of control is satisfied. But churning can occur in accounts even
where no formal discretion has been given. Securities law acknowledges the doctrine of "de facto control," where the customer
makes each final decision on a trade, but relies greatly on the broker's recommendation and does not exercise independent judgment.' While control may be found to exist when a highly
unsophisticated investor uniformly follows a broker's advice, it
should be clearly understood that mere consistency in acceptance
of a broker's recommendations is insufficient to establish control
absent a clear showing of a lack of customer sophistication. "The
touchstone is whether or not the customer has sufficient intelli2

2

ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEwis

TIES FRAUD

D.

LOWENFELS, SECURrrIES FRAUD AND COMMODI-

§ 5.7(310) (1992) (citations omitted).

3 Michael Slonim, Note, Customer Sophistication and a Plaintff's Duty of Due Diligence: A ProposedFrameworkfor Churning Actions in Nondiscretionary Accounts Under SEC
Rule l0b-5, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 1101, 1112 (1986) (footnote omitted).
4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 5.7(321).
5 Michael B. Dashjian, Overcoming Defenses to Churning Claims Under the Federal Securities Laws, 20 SEc. REG. LJ., 362, 374 (1993).
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gence and understanding to evaluate the broker's recommendations and to reject one when he thinks it unsuitable."6 A customer
able to make independent trading decisions may be termed sophisticated and may be deemed to retain control of the account, even
if he or she routinely relied on the broker's recommendations.7
Numerous factors determine an investor's level of sophistication
(e.g., age, affluence, education, prior securities experience, etc.).
The concept of sophistication will be addressed further when we
discuss suitability claims. Keep in mind that churning is both a
claim and a concept distinct from suitability.
2.

Excessive trading

The second element of churning is that the broker excessively
trades the account either in volume or frequency, in light of the
character and investment objectives of the account.8 The rationale
behind this element being that a broker who is trading excessively
is acting in his or her own interest for the purpose of generating
commissions and against the interests of his or her customers.
There is no single test to determine if trading is excessive. The
standard of measurement depends on the nature of the account,
which in turn, requires a focus upon the individual investor's
needs, objectives, and financial resources. 9 In addition, an analysis
of objective indicia such as turnover ratio, commission ratio, and
in-and-out trading determines excessiveness.
a.

Turnover Ratio

The most frequently utilized analytical tool for ascertaining
whether excessive trading has occurred in an account is the computation of the1 number of instances the money in the account was
"turned over." ° The turnover rate is the ratio of the number of
times an account's average net equity is used to purchase securities
during a given period of time (generally one year). The most frequently used method is to divide the total cost of every purchase
for the interval under consideration by the average investment.
This average investment is calculated by dividing the aggregate total of the net investment at each month's end during the interval
Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id see also Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983);
Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1983).
8 BROMBERG & LowENFELs, supra note 2, § 5.7(322).
6
7

9 See Costelo, 711 F.2d at 1368; Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327

(5th Cir. 1981); Carras v. Bums,516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975).
10 BROMBERG & LowENFELs, supra note 2, § 5.7(322) (1).
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under consideration (excluding loans) by the number of months.
Other infrequently used turnover rate computation methods include comparing the account's entire dollar sales for a whole year
to the account's assets at the beginning of the year. a" Some courts
and commentators have indicated that excessive tradingoccurs when there
is an annual turnover rate of six or greater,although this should not be
considered a "magic number" separating excessively traded accounts from those which have not been excessively traded.1 2 Also,
as emphasized above, it is impossible to isolate any particular mathematical formula or other analytical tool as uniquely determinative
13
of excessive trading.
There is a caveat to the foregoing. In connection with option
transactions where frequency is expected and there are high transaction costs, one should certainly look beyond the turnover rate
formula. One of the alternative approaches to determine excessive
trading is to look at commission ratios.
b.

Commission Ratio

The second most often used analytical tool to determine
whether an account has been excessively traded is computing the
ratio of the broker's commissions produced by the account to the
amount that the customer has invested in that account.1 4 This ratio is frequently discussed simultaneously with the ratio of the broker's commissions produced by the account to the broker's whole
commission income during the applicable period. Mark-ups that
the broker earned in primary transactions with customers and interest that the broker earned on the account are at times included
within the meaning of commissions. Similar to turnover rate, the
precise means of computing the commission ratios may deviate
some from case to case. No magic number separates an excessively
traded account from an account which has not been traded excessively, and no single factor is determinative. Nonetheless, authorities indicate that when a broker's annual commissions approach 25% of
the customer's investment, this reflects excessive trading.5
11 Id. (citation omitted).
12 Id. (emphasis added); see also Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814,

821 (9th Cir. 1980); Frota v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1186, 1191
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Moran v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 609 F. Supp. 661, 666 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), affd nem., 788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1986).
13 Dashjian, supra note 5, at 366.
14 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 5.7(322) (2).
15 Id; see Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
affd, 430 F.2d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added).
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"In and Out" Trading

The third most frequently used analytical tool to determine
whether an account has been excessively traded is to analyze the
quantity of "in and out" trading in the account. The term "in and
out" trading has been defined as "asale of all or part of the customer's
portfolio with the proceeds immediately reinvested in other securitiesfollowed
in a short period by the sale of the newly acquired securities."16 Here the
focus is upon the length of time during which each individual security was held in that account.1 7 Here again, as in the case of
turnover rate and commission ratios, no single factor is determinative, and there are no magic numbers."8 One must again look to the
nature of the investor, including his or her investment experience,
financial capacity and objectives, as well as to the pattern of overall
trading in the account.
d.

Losses to Equity Ratio and Other Criteria

Many additional analytical tools exist to determine whether an
account has been traded excessively which are used less commonly
than turnover rate, commission ratios, and "in and out" trading.
These less frequently used analytical methods include the ratio of
account losses to the account equity, the purchased securities'
quality, and cross trading.1 9 Cross trading results where a broker
organizes buying and selling between customers.20 Cross trading
analysis is employed together with one or several of the three prin21
cipal analytical tools "in a supplementary or buttressing capacity."
The ratio of losses to equity analysis is referred to in several
SEC enforcement proceedings involving churning, while the quality of the purchased securities is mentioned in several private damage cases involving churning. 2
16 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 5.7(322) (3) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
17 See Mihara, 619 F.2d at 819.
18 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 5.7(322) (2) (emphasis added).
19 Id. at § 5.7(322) (4).
20 Id. (emphasis added). See Note, Churningby Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REV.
869, 877 (1967).
21 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 5.7(322) (4).
22 Id; see, e.g., In re Michael E. Tennenbaum, Exchange Act Release No. 18,429
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,092, at 84,810 (Jan. 19,
1982) (SEC action where Commission found excessive trading in a case involving options accounts with high commission ratios, conservative investment goals, and considerable losses); Gleit v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,799, at 90,890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (private action where the
court considered the quality of the securities purchased).
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Scienter

The third element required by a majority of courts, although
not required by the NASD, in the proof of a churning claim is that
the broker must have either intentionally defrauded or willfully
and recklessly disregarded the customer's interests (i.e. scienter).23
Churning, therefore, cannot be predicated strictly on negligence.
Some courts have considered proof of the broker's motivation in
addition to the general scienter requirement, while others have indicated that scienter does not have to be proved separately, as it
may be implied in the broker's conduct. 24 Commentators have
suggested that this apparent judicial disagreement "is probably
much ado about nothing because it is difficult to see how scienter
could be absent where the defendant, having control of a customer's account, trades excessively in light of the customer's investment objectives." 25 A broker is assumed to have knowledge of the
laws and rules governing broker professional conduct. If a broker
trades an account for no legitimate and credible investment purpose (i.e. investments which are not in the best interests of the
customer), the broker cannot deny that the primary, if not exclusive, objective was to generate commissions. Consideration of what
defenses are available to a claim of churning will help us further
understand its basic nature.
4.

Defenses to Churning

The defenses most frequently employed to overcome a churning claim are waiver, laches, estoppel, and ratification. 26 It should
be noted that customer profits are not a per se defense to
27
churning.
Waiver is the knowing and voluntary surrender of a legal
right. 28 The rationale behind the doctrine of waiver is that the customer was put on notice of the transactions and had ample opportunity to raise objections to any transactions believed to be
improper, yet voluntarily or intentionally relinquished a known
right of action.2 9
Laches, or sitting on one's rights, is defined as "(1) a lack of
23 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 5.7(323); see, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
24 Slonim, supra note 3, at 1103-04 (footnotes omitted).
25 BROMBERG & LowENEwLs, supra note 2, § 5.7(323).

26 Id. at § 5.7(330).
27 Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 1981).
28 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 5.7(330) (citation omitted).

29 See, e.g., Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 711 F.2d 1361, 1370 (7th Cir.
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diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted and (2)
prejudice to the party asserting the defense."3 0 It is a defense
based upon the inherent unfairness of permitting a customer to
sue after the expiration of a reasonable time from discovering the
wrongful conduct. The party asserting the defense
is damaged by
31
detrimentally relying on his adversary's conduct.
The definition of estoppel is set out in Hampton v. Paramount
Pictures Corp.:32
Four elements must be present to establish the defense of estoppel: (1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he
must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act
that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so
intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and
(4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.3 3
If a customer sits on his or her rights (i.e. does not employ due
diligence in pursuing a complaint), the customer may be estopped
from asserting his or her rights of recovery. The customer cannot
wait and see if a trade will be a winner or loser and object in the
event it becomes a loser.3 " The objection must be asserted on a
timely basis.
It should be noted that these defenses to churning are, at best,
limited in application. Certain courts have held that the defenses
of waiver, laches, estoppel, and ratification only apply to suitability
claims and do not apply to churning cases. To repeat for emphasis,
certain courts have rejected these defenses in toto as they applied to
churning and held defendant's liable for churning.3 5 One apparent basis for this rejection is the sense that churning is a course of
action not cognizable to investors until the churning is completed
or, minimally, until a fair amount of time has elapsed.
B.

Suitability / "Know Your Customer"

The concepts of suitability and "know your customer" are
among the most fundamental obligations for a securities broker.
1983); Jaksich v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 485, 497 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
30 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 5.7(331) (citation omitted); see also
Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 1980).
31 BROMBERG & LowENFELs, supra note 2, § 5.7(331) (citing Royal Air Properties,
Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 1964)).
32 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960).
33 Id. at 104 (citation omitted).
34 See In re Olympia Brewing Co.Sec. Litig., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,461, at 92,819 (N.D. Il1. 1985).
35 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 2, § 5.7(332).
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That is, a broker must know his or her customer and make suitable
recommendations in light of that knowledge. These basic concepts
go to the heart of the broker's conduct as a professional. Suitability is a non-delegable obligation. No broker can violate this obligation and fully exonerate himself from responsibility, or blame
other persons or entities, including supervisors or others in the
brokerage house chain of command. Suitability is a concept which
has been defined largely in the courts, but only so far as to distinguish between a private cause of action and an industry standard.
The NASD and NYSE rules significantly address suitability more
significantly and set forth what have become known as the "know
your customer" and suitability rules. The NASD suitability rule is
set forth in detail immediately below.
2152 Recommendations to Customers

Sec. 2. (a) In recommending to a customer the purchase,
sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, ifany, disclosed by such customer as to
his other security holdings and as to his financialsituation and needs.
(b) Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended to a
non-institutional customer, other than transactions with customers where investments are limited to money market mutual
funds, a member shall make reasonable efforts to obtain information
concerning.
(i) the customer's financial status;,
(ii) the customer's tax status;
(iii) the customer's investment objectives;, and
(iv) such other information used or considered to be
reasonable and by such member or registered
representative
in making recommendations to the
36
customer.
The policy behind the rule, as set forth by the NASD Board of

Governors, is as follows:
FAIR DEALING WITH CUSTOMERS

Implicit in all member and registered representative relationships with customers and others is the fundamental responsibility for fair dealing. Sales efforts must therefore be undertaken
only on a basis that can be judged as being within the ethical
standards of the Association's rules, with particular emphasis on
the requirement to deal fairly with the public.
36 N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2 (1 2152), reprinted in NATIONAL ASSO(CCH) (1993) (emphasis
added).
CIATION OF SECURIrrIEs DEALERS, INC. MANuAL at 2041
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This does not mean that legitimate sales efforts in the securities business are to be discouraged by requirements which do
not take into account the variety of circumstances which can
enter into the member-customer relationship. It does mean,
however, that sales efforts must be judged on the basis of whether they
can be reasonably said to representfair treatmentfor the persons to whom
the sales efforts are directed, ratherthan on the argument that they result
in profits to customers.3 7
The policy
violations:

specifically

notes

the following

practices

as

RECOMMENDING SPECULATIVE LOW-PRICED SECURITIES

1. Recommending speculative low-priced securities to customers without knowledge of or attempt to obtain information
concerning the customers' other securities holdings, their financial situation, and other necessary data. The principle here is
that this practice, by its very nature, involves a high probability
that the recommendation will not be suitable for at least some
of the persons solicited. This has particular application to high
pressure telephone sales campaigns.
RECOMMENDING PURCHASES BEYOND CUSTOMER CAPABILITY

5. Recommending the purchase of securities or the continuing purchase of securities in amounts which are inconsistent
with the reasonable expectation that the3 customer
has the finan8
commitment.
a
such
meet
to
ability
cial
Another SRO Rule, NYSE Rule 405, requires that a broker
know his or her customer's financial background, capacity to understand and take risks, and investment objectives and apply that
knowledge to each and every order and transaction so that the broker makes suitable securities recommendations to the customer.
The NYSE rule requires that the broker fully understand, as well as
have full knowledge of, the security recommended and the customer's capacities, needs, and objectives. Suitability claims arise
when unsophisticated investors rely on the broker or advisor to
make and/or implement securities recommendations, and the professional fails to meet his or her obligations to know the customer
and invest suitably. The NASD suitability rule focuses upon the
reasonableness of the securities recommendations, whereas NYSE
Rule 405, if it is distinguishable, places more emphasis upon the
broker's overall handling of the account.
37

Id. at 2042 (emphasis added).

38 Id. at 2043.
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The basic obligations required by NYSE Rule 405 are of critical
importance. They are set forth as follows:
DILIGENCE AS TO AccouNTs
Every member organization is required through a general
partner, a principal executive officer or a person or persons designated under the provisions of Rule 342(b) (1) [ 2342] to
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to
every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organization and every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried by
such organization.
SUPERVISION OF AccouNTs
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered
representatives of the organization.
APPROVAL OF AccouNTs
(3) Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to
or promptly after the completion of any transaction for the account of or with a customer, provided, however, that in the case
of branch offices, the opening of an account for a customer may
be approved by the manager of such branch office but the action of such branch office manager shall within a reasonable
time be approved by a general partner, a principal executive officer or a person or persons designated under the provisions of
Rule 342(b) (1) [ 2342]. The member, general partner, officer
or designated person approving the opening of the account
shall, prior to giving his approval, be personally informed as to
the essential facts relative to the customer and to the nature of
the proposed account and shall indicate his approval in writing
on a document which 3is9 a part of the permanent records of his
office or organization.
Integral to, yet separate from, suitability is the requirement
that every security recommendation be well based. Thus, every recommendation must have a reasonable basis. A securities broker
should only recommend to a customer a security in which the broker has a solid information base that includes and draws upon prospectuses, annual reports, press releases, and other written
material typically relied upon by brokers in determining whether a
security is an attractive investment. Of course this does not suggest
that every recommendation must be profitable. What is required is
that the broker research his or her recommendations and formulate valid reasons for the recommendation (e.g., research reports,
technical analysis, improved earnings, the issuer's market niche,
39

N.Y.S.E. Rule 405, reprintedin

NEWYORK STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE

(CCH) (1993).
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new products or technology, a different management team, and/
or current events impacting market price). The securities broker,
like any professional, does not have to be right-just reasonable.
Of course every customer is different and recommendations
must be specifically tailored to the stated needs and objectives of
the individual customer. From the first cold call through the filling out of the new account card and account agreements to the
first securities recommendation, the "know your customer" and
suitability rules mandate a qualification process. The truly professional broker engages in an interactive dialogue with the customer,
determining the customer's net worth, annual income, market experience, capacity to understand the risks of investment, and his or
her economic ability to absorb a loss. Accurately ascertaining the
customer's objectives is critical. It helps prevent unrealistic expectations and losses which the customer is not prepared to accept or
absorb. The suitability rules are especially pertinent when lower
priced, higher risk securities are offered and sold (see discussion of
SEC penny stock rules herein). Where the broker and the customer do not have a personal or business relationship predating
the opening of the brokerage account, written verification of this
pertinent new account data establishes credibility and creates a virtual safe harbor for the customer and the broker at least as it relates to suitability.
To summarize, the obligation of the securities professional to
adhere to the standards of care set out in the foregoing rules is a
fundamental one. The securities professional must learn basic information about the customer's financial position, assess the client's ability to understand and take the risks before going into the
recommended transactions, and make sure that each and every
transaction, as well as the overall handling of the account, has been
customized to develop an appropriate and cost-effective strategy
for the client. Should a dispute arise between the broker and customer as to how much the customer understood and relied on the
broker for advice and whether the appropriate investment strategy
was implemented, credibility is a key factor. Full and accurate customer account documentation has persuasive, if not compelling,
force upon an arbitration panel.
In discussing the suitability rules, our attention has been focused on the obligations of a broker to the address the specific
needs and objectives of the individualcustomer. We must not forget, however, that the securities laws and rules also sweep more
broadly. Certain laws and rules apply across-the-board to all cus-
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tomers, regardless of background, needs, or objectives. The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, for example, prohibit misstatements and omissions of a material fact made in connection with securities transactions no matter how sophisticated or
unsophisticated the customer. This goes to a broker's obligation to
speak truthfully and disclose obvious risks. While it is easy to defend the stockbroker's reasonableness ofjudgment, it is difficult if
not impossible to defend a lie or a half-truth. This proposition,
more than anything else, is the key to the strategy of avoiding
stockbroker malpractice. A broker has broad discretion to give his
or her opinion within the bounds of good faith and reasonableness, if that opinion is carefully grounded in fact, and backed up by
diligent and accurate research. The obligation to tell the truth
(and never fail to tell a material fact) is paramount.
C.

Customer Responsibility and Capital Market Integrity

Thus far we have spoken at length about the obligations of the
securities professional to the customer. Now we look to the responsibilities of the customer. An excellent illustration of how a
firm and its registered representatives protected themselves by successfully establishing a customer responsibility defense is provided
in Stephenson v. Paine WebberJackson & Curtis, Inc.40 In Stephenson,
the customer, a sophisticated tax lawyer, wrote a number of complaint letters to the firm in August 1983 for an account that was
opened in 1979, claiming at least 59 unauthorized trades.4 1 Account statements and confirmations of these transactions were sent
out in a regular and timely fashion. The customer argued, however, that the transactions were never contested, or even reviewed,
because the statements were viewed as 'junk mail."42 The court
held such a contention to be untenable.43 The court wrote, giving
effect to both the wisdom and character of the customer responsibility defense:
The doctrine of due diligence and equitable defenses, like
waiver, laches, estoppel or ratification, require an investor to be
attentive to self protection .... We have rightly stated "by requiring... [customers] to invest carefully the Court promotes
the anti-fraud policies of the [Securities] Acts and engenders stability in the markets." These standardsrelatingto a [customer's] con40 [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
Cir. 1988).
41 Id. at 98,094, 98,095.
42 Id. at 98,095.
43 Id. at 98,097.

93,675, at 98,094 (5th
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duct encourage an investor to complain promptly about violations of his

or her rights and, in so doing, to enable those with authority to control
wrongdoing before additional investors are injured."
Thus, a sufficiently knowledgeable customer who fails to complain and timely contest improper activity in his or her account
bears responsibility for his or her behavior (or lack thereof). Many
customers ride the shibboleth that "buyer beware" no longer applies and that brokers should have full and complete responsibility
for all losses. Today's equation for capital market integrity, as the
above quotation illustrates, is not only broker responsibility but significant customer responsibility as well.
D.

The SEC Suitability Rule for Penny Stocks

In August 1989, pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), the SEC adopted Rule 15c2-6 (later
redesignated as l5g-l to 15g-9 ).4 5 The rule addresses the use of

high-pressure unsolicited telephone calls and misleading sales
practices by broker-dealers selling "penny stocks" to unsophisticated, low income, and low net worth investors.4 6 The rule became
effective January 1, 1990 and imposes a number of new requirements on brokers and firms soliciting certain low priced (less than
$5 per share), non-NASDAQ over-the-counter securities ("designated securities") to new customers.
Additionally, under the rule, prior to any sale of a designated
security, a broker-dealer is required to secure from the prospective
customer certain financial information and make a written determination that the designated securities are suitable for the investor. 4' This written suitability determination is in addition to the
standard SRO suitability requirements that every broker-dealer is
obliged to make for all recommended securities transactions. To
assure that this is accomplished, the broker-dealer is required to
deliver a copy of the suitability statement to the customer for verification and signature and retain a copy of the signed agreement in
the firm's file.4 9
The rule requires that a broker-dealer obtain a written authorization from the customer for the first three purchases of desig44

Id. at 98,096 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

45 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-6 (1993).
46 Id.
47

Id.

48
49

Id.

Id.
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nated securities before each transaction can be executed. 50 The
stated and manifest purpose for the requirements here is to provide customers with time to investigate the merits of the security,
consult with others, such as their accountant and tax preparer, and
fully consider the desirability of the transaction before entering
into it.
The rule and its effects were studied by a 15c2-6 Sweep Report.5 1 In March 1990, examiners of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") and the Florida Controller's Office conducted a coordinated and nationwide series of 188 examinations to check compliance with Rule 15c2-6. On February 8,
1991, the SEC published the staff's findings, which revealed generally that the majority of firms had substantially complied with the
new rule.5 2
The Sweep Report also identified and described typical violations of Rule 15c2-6. The violations were as follows:
1. The broker-dealer records did not contain suitability statements and/or written agreements for sales of designated securities
to non-established customers.
2. The firms were using deficient suitability statements and/
or written agreement forms.
3. Broker-dealer records contained incomplete suitability
statements and written agreement forms (e.g. the absence of customer signatures, dates, customer suitability information, names of
recommended securities and quantity of transactions).
4. Firms failed to adopt written supervisory procedures to implement Rule 15c2-6.5"
The SEC's findings should also be a starting point for the development of procedures to avoid the risks and abuses which the rule(s)
and its policy are intended to protect against.
Also, and most significantly, the Sweep Report provided a profile of penny stock investors. The average purchaser of designated
securities was 48 years old, had a net worth of $303,000 and an
annual income of $63,000; the median purchaser was 47 years old,
54
had a net worth of $200,000 and an annual income of $50,000.
Obviously, members of this group, because of their age, in50 Id.
51 REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISION ON THE RuLE

15c2-6 EXAMINATION
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.

SWEEP

(Feb. 8, 1991).
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come, and outlook for future earnings and net worth aggrandizement, are appropriate investors in more -speculative, higher risk
securities. The broker-dealer, however, is well advised to focus on
individuals with substantially higher income and net worth
amounts than the average or median figures discussed above. Such
people are likely to be entrepreneurs and sophisticated businesspersons who are familiar with the risks associated with low-cap speculative securities (i.e. investing in small or emerging companies
offering new products or technology). Targeting this demographic
group provides the broker with potentially suitable (and receptive)
customers. This, coupled with a professional selling effort, will
minimize securities malpractice claims.
The other obvious lesson of the Sweep Report's interpretation
of SEC Rule 15c2-6 [Rule(s) 15gl-9], is that the broker should not
sell on a cold call. The broker must engage in an extended qualification process, documenting the customer's disposition, qualification and desire to trade such securities. The obvious purpose of
the written suitability determination for initial transactions with
new customers is that the broker gets to know his or her customer
and provide that customer adequate time to deliberate before making an investment decision. In short, this purpose is to decisively
negate any inference of high-pressure sales tactics.
The designated securities (or "penny stocks") covered by the
special suitability rule require particular attention. Designated securities are, by definition, priced below $5 per share and generally
are thinly traded; the cash compensation to the broker is high in
relation to market price and intrinsic value of the securities; and
reliable information about the security is less available than information for exchange or NASDAQ-listed securities. Public customers trading in "penny stocks," unless they have an established
relationship with the broker-dealer and are qualified to understand
and take the risks of such transactions, need the special protection
of this rule along with the careful implementation by the firm of
its supervisory responsibilities over its salespersons.
E.

SRO Rules Violations

The rules of the various SRO's (like the NASD and the NYSE),
if violated and causative of harm, produce the best chance of success by claimants in arbitration and are perhaps the truest expression of securities brokers' malpractice. Unlike suitability and
churning, which have evolved largely through the courts and involve case-by-case analysis and the balancing of numerous factors,
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the SRO rules provide clear-cut and well defined minimum standards of care.
The NYSE rules are important statements of public policy and,
as a matter of law, cannot be waived. Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act provides, in pertinent part, "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with...
55
any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
The legislative history pertinent to this statutory section makes
it clear that any claim of waiver of these exchange rules is seldom
proper. Congress declared its plain intent on this precise point as
follows: "This subsection declares void any condition or stipulation requiring any person to waive compliance with any provision of the act or
any rule or regulation thereunder or any rule of exchange."56
While the NASD is not an exchange, it is an SRO mandated by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to, among other things, act as
an industry self-regulator of the OTC securities markets. The
NASD is empowered to investigate and discipline its members for
violations of the securities laws and rules, as well as its own rules.
NASD rules must be consistent with the fundamental purposes of
federal securities regulation, and their violation also cannot be
disregarded.-"
Courts have recognized that SRO members are contractually
bound by the rules and regulations of their organizations.5 8 As
noted in Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., "[t] he constitution and rules
of a stock exchange constitute a contract between all members of
the exchange with each other and with the exchange itself."59
Indisputably, many of the rules such as NYSE Rule 405, Rule
724 (discretion), and Rule 726 (option disclosure) are clearly for
the protection of the public customer.6" Where a third party is the
intended beneficiary of a contract, the law permits recovery for the
contract's violation. 6 ' Thus, public customers should be able to
55 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1988).

56 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. at 28 (1934) (emphasis added). See
Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (E.D. La. 1952); see also
Cohen v. G.F. Rothschild & Co., Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
90,849, 92,671
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (footnote omitted); Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838,
843-44 n.8 (2d Cir. 1952) (citing § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 which
states a similar legislative intent).
57 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 6(a), 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1988).
58 Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1211 (2d Cir. 1972) (citations
omitted).
59 287 F. Supp. 766, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (citations omitted).
60 See Appendix I (listing basic SRO rules).
61 In re-Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250
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claim the benefit of these rules and be permitted recovery when
the rules are violated, causing them substantive economic injury.
Lawyers, accountants, engineers, architects, dentists, and doctors are all judged by the standards articulated by their own professions in both the disciplinary and civil contexts. Market and
financial service professionals are now, more than ever, holding
themselves out as professionals and have to be treated as such. The
financial service professional, as is any professional, therefore, is
charged with the knowledge of the rules of the profession.6 2 Account executives and their supervisors clearly should be deemed to
be fiduciaries and professionals and accountable as such.6" Violations of fundamental SRO rules allow for easy and just assessments
of liability. SRO rules, whose strict observance must be maintained, set the standards. Where their violation causes harm, absent valid defenses, recovery should be awarded to the customer.
Any other argument not only detracts from viable self-regulation in
the securities industry, but from effective and just dispute resolution in the securities law arbitration context.
Securities arbitrators are required to follow and apply the securities laws and rules in arbitration.6 4 The laws and rules enacted
by Congress, the SEC, and the SRO's (pursuant to the statutory
framework of the federal securities laws) are, if nothing else, an
expression of the duties of care that exist for the protection of public investors.65
SRO rules, especially in the arbitration context, afford a basis
for public customers to assert claims of securities broker malpractice. SRO rules express standards of required care and professional conduct. Violation of SRO rules, when demonstrated to
cause harm, clearly should be actionable, especially in the arbitral
forum. SRO rules and securities arbitrations are essential parts of
the system of self-regulation and merit respect and complete en(2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., County of Nassau v. Owens, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Burns
Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451 N.E.2d 459, 469 (N.Y. 1983);
Bonwell v. Stone, 513 N.Y.S.2d 547, 549 (App. Div. 1987).
62 Wasserman v. Board of Regents, 227 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1962); Nisnewitz v.
Board of Regents, 464 N.Y.S.2d 287, 289 (App. Div. 1983); Shmelzer v. Ambach, 448
N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (App. Div. 1982); Irwin v. Board of Regents, 304 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321
(App. Div. 1963).
63

See EzRA

WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS,

chs. 5

and 12 (1965).
64 Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987); Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 433-34 (1953); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1986).
65 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-16 (1934).
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forcement. The securities community developed the SRO rules
(under regulatory oversight) for their own governance and for the
resolution of disputes. These rules serve as clear, up-front and actual notice to members of the securities industry of the rules of
conduct, and as a workable and concrete basis for arbitrators to
adjudge liability when these standards are violated.
For example, NYSE Rule 408 requires a writing before a broker can exercise discretion in an account (i.e. whether to buy or
sell a given security and at what quantity).66 The writing eliminates
the possibility of dispute after the trade takes place, negates any
second-guessing by the customer, and assures the customer that his
informed consent, where required, will be obtained on a specific
trade-by-trade basis.
Thus, SRO rules provide the truest standard for measuring securities broker malpractice since the SRO rules provide clear-cut
requirements of care.
II.

BROKER-DEALER ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY

Nowhere is responsibility of a supervisor more pronounced
than in the context of securities broker malpractice claims and
their avoidance. Reduced to its fundamentals, the duty to supervise includes the duty to: articulate a managerial and organizational policy to ensure that the firm's activities are consistent with
the law; teach the policy to the firm's agents and employees; review
the transaction records of the organization to detect possible violations and conduct follow-up inquiries to determine whether violations have occurred; and act concretely to prevent further
violations and to correct their effect when on actual or inquiry notice that violations have occurred. Breach of the duty to supervise
creates liability on the part of the organization, and particularly
upon those designated to oversee the conduct of its agents and
employees. Liability is not automatic, even in the face of a violation by an agent or employee, although it is virtually certain when
there is a failure to follow the prescriptions cited above to articulate, teach, review/inquire, and prevent.
Key statutory provisions make manifest the foregoing components of supervisory responsibility. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act") provides for sanctions against a broker/
dealer that is found to have "failed reasonably to supervise .... 67
66 See Appendix I, infra.
67 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b) (4) (E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1988).
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The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who ... controls any person liable.., shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controllingperson had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by68 reason of which
the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.

Similarly, the Exchange Act provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable . . . shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom
such controlled person is liable, unless the controllingperson acted
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.69

The SRO's also address the important duty of supervision.
NYSE Rule 405 (2) requires member organizations to "supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the organization."7" The NASD rules require members to establish,
maintain, and enforce written procedures for supervising activities
of registered representatives, reviewing customer accounts, and
keeping records. 7 '
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") in In reJohn H. Gutfreund, has given recent, clear, and concrete guidance in regard to what supervisors must do, especially
when on notice of violations of law and regulation.7 2 The Gutfreund proceeding was both a broker-dealer administrative disciplinary proceeding as well as a report of investigation. The three
named respondents were all officers of Salomon Brothers, Inc.
("Salomon"). John H. Gutfreund ("Gutfreund"), Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Thomas W. Strauss ("Strauss"), President,
and John W. Meriwether ("Meriwether"), Vice Chairman and person in charge of Salomon's fixed income trading activities, were
provided information in late April 1991 that Paul Mozer ("Mozer")
the managing director of Salomon's Government Trading Desk,
68 Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988) (emphasis added).
69 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(t)(a) (1988) (emphasis
added).
70 NYSE Rule 405(2), reprinted in NEW YORx STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE, (CCH)
(1993).
71 NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 27(a), reprinted in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF SECURITIES Dr.ALms, INC. MANuAL at 2215 (CCH) (1993).
72 In reJohn H. Gutfreund, SEC Rul., Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554 [1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,067, at 83,597 (December 3, 1992).

210

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:190

had presented a false bid in a U.S. Treasury securities auction on
February 21, 1991. 7 ' The respondents were further informed by
the chief legal officer that the false bid, which counsel described as
a criminal act, was placed to circumvent the limit of the maximum
bid that any one bidder could submit in an auction of U.S. Treasury securities. Bids were submitted at the same yield and in the
names of two different customers, without the knowledge or approval of either customer. After the results of the auction were
announced, Mozer caused tickets to be written in the names of the
customers, suppressed the confirmations, and "directed the clerk
to write trade tickets 'selling' the same amounts from those accounts back to Salomon at the same price." 74 After the controlling
and supervisory personnel were informed of this critical information, no further inquiry or action was taken.7 5 Subsequently, false
bids following the same modus operandi, to wit, unauthorized use of
customer accounts, suppression of confirmations, and a step transaction causing purchase by Salomon, were again made and in clear
derogation of the essential integrity for the auction markets. This
occurred in April, 1991 and May, 1991, notwithstanding the fact
that Salomon's upper level management and chief legal officer
were informed of the false February bid prior to the April and May
false bids.76 No corrective or preventive action was taken.77
InJuly 1991, Salomon engaged outside counsel to do an internal investigation, which further disclosed that a false bid was submitted in the auction market by Mozer on December 27, 1990,
following the same modus operandi.7s As a result of the disclosures,
Gutfreund, Strauss, and Meriwether resigned, and the SEC instituted an action in the United States District for the Southern District of New York, charging violations of the federal securities laws,
principally, the submission of false bids in the auctions for U.S.
Treasury securities. In addition to the consent judgments for injunctive relief, Salomon was required to pay $290 million, of which
$190 million went to the U.S. Treasury as civil penalties and $100
million for a civil claims fund.79
The Commission issued a report of investigation, where it not
only spelled out the concept of supervisory responsibility, but most
73

Id. at 83,599.

74 Id.
75 Id. at 83,602.
76 Id.
77 Id.

at 83,604.

78 Id.
79

Id. at 83,605.
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significantly, set forth its expectations regarding those responsibilities and how they should be performed. The Commission relied
on Section 15(b) (4) (E) of the Exchange Act, which "authorizes
the Commission to impose sanctions against a broker-dealer if the
firm has: failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing
violations of [federal securities laws], another person who commits
such a violation, if such person is subject to his supervision."80
The report also noted:
Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act incorporates Section
15(b) (4) (E) by reference and authorizes the Commission to impose sanctions for deficient supervision of individuals associated
with broker-dealers.
.. The Commission has long emphasized that the responsibility of broker-dealers to supervise their employees is a critical
component of the federal regulatory scheme. ...
The supervisory obligations imposed by the federal securities laws require a vigorous response even to indications of
wrongdoing. Many of the Commission's cases involving a failure
to supervise arise from situations where supervisors were aware
only of "red flags" or "suggestions" of irregularity, rather than
situations where, as here, supervisors were explicitly informed of
an illegal act.
Even where the knowledge of supervisors is limited to "red
flags" or "suggestions" of irregularity, they cannot discharge
their supervisory obligations simply by relying on the unverified
representations of employees. Instead, as the Commission has
repeatedly emphasized, "[t] here must be adequate follow-up and
review when a firm's own procedures detect irregularities or unusual trading activity ....

."

Moreover, if more than one supervi-

sor is involved in considering the actions to be taken in response
to possible misconduct, there must be a clear definition of the
efforts to be taken and a clear assignment of those responsibilities to specific individuals within the firm."1
The report continued:
While they could look to counsel for guidance, they had an affirmative obligation to undertake an appropriate inquiry. If
they were unable to conduct the inquiry themselves or believed
it was more appropriate that the inquiry be conducted by others,
they were required to take prompt action to ensure that others
in fact undertook those efforts. Such an inquiry could have
been conducted by the legal or compliance departments of the
80

Id. at 83,605-06 (quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 15(b) (4) (E), 15

U.S.C. 78o (1988).
81

Id. at 83,606 (footnotes omitted).
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firm, outside counsel, or others who had the ability to investigate the matter adequately. The supervisors were also required,
pending the outcome of such an investigation, to increase supervision of Mozer and to place appropriate limitations on his
activities.
Had limits been placed on . . .[Mozer's] activities after the one unauthorized bid was disclosed, these violations might have been prevented
.... The supervisors were required to take action reasonably designed to
prevent a repetition of the misconduct that had been disclosed to them.8 2
Moreover, the Commission made it eminently clear that supervisory responsibility and liability cannot be evaded by reason of title
or ostensible delegation of authority (i.e. to a lawyer or other
outside consultant) and that the exercise of follow-up responsibilities is essential. The Commission declared:
The president of a corporate broker-dealer is responsible for
compliance with all of the requirements imposed on his firm
unless and until he reasonably delegates particular functions to
another person in that firm, and neither knows nor 8has
reason
3
to know that such person's performance is deficient.
The Commission concluded:
Employees of brokerage firms who have legal or compliance responsibilities do not become "supervisors" for purposes of Sections 15(b) (4) (E) and 15(b) (6) solely because they occupy
those positions. Rather, determining ifa particularperson is a "supervisor" depends on whether, under the facts and circumstances of a
particularcase, thatperson has a requisite degree of responsibility, ability
or authority to affect the conduct of the employee whose behavior is at
issue. Thus, persons occupying positions in the legal or compliance departments of broker-dealers have been found by the Commission to be
"supervisors"for purposes 84
of Sections 15(b) (4) (E) and 15(b) (6)
under certain circumstances.
The Gutfteund ruling makes clear that the assignment of supervisory responsibility and liability is a function of those who occupy
positions in the organization which in fact confer the responsibility, ability, or authority to exercise supervision.
Note that Appendix II, infra, sets out a sample compliance
memorandum for cold calling and recommending low priced securities. It also contains, most significantly, a sample new account
opening disclosure letter outlining a hypothetical firm's method of
82

Id. at 83,606, 83,607 (emphasis added).

83 Id. at 83,608 n.21 (citations omitted).
84

Id. at 83,608-09 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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engaging in securities activity. This hypothetical firm permits and
mandates those who wish to do business to learn about the essential character of the firm's activity so they will not be heard to complain about the nature of their securities transactions in the
context of overall account activity. Appendix III sets forth a memorandum of the hypothetical firm's teaching efforts and supervisory
responsibility and contains a place for the essential written acknowledgment of each registered representative to its contents and
directives.
III.

SRO

ARBITRATION

The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE"), American
Stock Exchange, Inc. ("AMEX"), the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"), and, to a lesser extent, the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") are the inevitable forums for virtually every securities broker's malpractice claim. Virtually all customer and broker-dealer relationships in today's securities markets
are predicated from their outset on a customer agreement containing an arbitration provision. No major firm will do business without customer signature and execution of such an agreement.
Typically, the agreement reads as follows:
THE CUSTOMER AGREES, AND BY CARRYING AN ACCOUNT FOR THE CUSTOMER THE BROKER AGREES THAT
ALL CONTROVERSIES WHICH MAY ARISE BETWEEN US
CONCERNING ANY TRANSACTION OR THE CONSTRUCTION, PERFORMANCE, OR BREACH OF THIS OR ANY
OTHER AGREEMENT BETWEEN US PERTAINING TO SECURITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY, WHETHER ENTERED
INTO PRIOR, ON OR SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE
HEREOF, SHALL BE DETERMINED BY ARBITRATION. ANY
ARBITRATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT AND THE LAWS OF THE STATE DESIGNATED IN PARAGRAPH 18, BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, OR BEFORE THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,
INC. OR AN ARBITRATION FACILITY PROVIDED BY ANY
OTHER EXCHANGE OF WHICH THE BROKER IS A MEMBER, OR THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS, INC. OR THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
RULEMAKING BOARD AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RULES OBTAINING OF THE SELECTED ORGANIZATION,
THE CUSTOMER MAY ELECT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE
WHETHER ARBITRATION SHALL BE BY THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, OR BY AN EXCHANGE OR
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SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION OF WHICH THE BROKER IS A MEMBER, BUT IF THE CUSTOMER FAILS TO
MAKE SUCH ELECTION, BY REGISTERED LETTER OR TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO THE BROKER AT THE BROKER'S
MAIN OFFICE, BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF TEN DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF A WRITTEN REQUEST FROM THE BROKER TO MAKE SUCH ELECTION, THEN THE BROKER MAY
MAKE SUCH ELECTION, THE AWARD OF THE ARBITRATORS, OR OF THE MAJORITY OF THEM, SHALL BE FINAL,
AND JUDGMENT UPON THE AWARD RENDERED MAY BE
ENTERED IN ANY COURT, STATE OR FEDERAL, HAVING
JURISDICTION." 5
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon 6 and its progeny
make such an arbitration provision almost impregnable to any
form of legal challenge. Arbitration clauses such as the one set
forth above are uniformly upheld by courts unless found to be unconscionable or specifically induced by fraud. The courts applying
the Federal Arbitration Act favor arbitration as a method of dispute
resolution and liberally interpret arbitration provisions. Shearson
has transformed the litigant's right to a "day in court," to a "day in
arbitration." Courts will broadly and uniformly enforce arbitration
provisions in the customer-broker-dealer contracts.
Professors Bromberg and Lowenfels correctly note:
[i] t should be clearly recognized ... that challenging an arbitration award is usually fruitless and can be dangerous... Quick &
Reilly, Inc. v. Jacobson, 126 F.R.D. 24 C.C.H.
94.461 at pp.
92.967-8.... (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1989). [Law firm that filed suit
seeking to set aside $1,850,170 arbitration award against brokerage firm on grounds arbitrators exceeded their authority must
pay $25,000 in sanctions for bringing claims totally devoid of
merit] .87
Theoretically, arbitration awards can be challenged pursuant
to the Federal Arbitration Act where the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means. In reality, this is virtually an
impossible standard. Judicial review is extremely limited. Self-regulatory organizations such as the NYSE, AMEX, and the NASD
have rules providing fair procedures for the presentation and defense of arbitration claims and provide the functional equivalent of
litigation before a court of law.
85

86

Securities Industry Association, Legal Alert, at 5 (July 14, 1989).
482 U.S. 220 (1987).

87 ALAN

R.

BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY ARBITRATIONS:

AN EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS,

1 400, at 10. Id. at Chap. 1030, p. 63.
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Both the law and practicality militate in favor of securities law
arbitrations in customer-broker-dealer disputes. Arbitration proceedings typically do not require extensive and formal pleadings
(often a letter with a schedule of trading, statement of profit and
loss, and citation to alleged SRO rules violations will be sufficient).
Motion practice is limited and pretrial discovery is expected to be
worked out between the parties (although pre-hearing conferences
may be called to address unresolved discovery issues). Arbitrations,
as a rule, can be processed on a more cost-effective basis than in
the courts.
The rules of evidence are relaxed in arbitration, and as a result, arbitration affords the parties the maximum opportunity to be
heard. Therein lies both the vice and the virtue of arbitration. In
developing or defending against a securities broker's malpractice
claim or defense in arbitration, the lawyer, industry professional,
and customer should pay attention to the "layman's equities." That
is, he/she must in common sense terms assess the way the customer's account was handled, in light of the SRO rules, and if improper activity is determined to have occurred, determine the
amount of damages. Aristotle said of arbitration the following:
Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law, and it is
equitable to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator
keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only on the law
and the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity
might prevail.
This inscription is posted over the door to New York Stock
Exchange Arbitration Conference Room A and should be taken
into consideration by those contemplating the assertion and defense of claims in arbitration, and by those broker-dealers who erroneously think that technical but unfair compliance with both the
spirit and letter of the SRO rules will suffice to avoid claims as well
as awards. The best lesson from the foregoing is to think practically and in terms of simple right and wrong, and this will be a
good guidepost as to whether the claim should be pursued, how it
should be defended, and, most significantly, how it can be avoided.
IV.

DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENSE OF A SECURITIES CLAIM: THE
ROLE OF THE INVESTIGATOR, ACCOUNTING EXPERT AND

ATToRNEv

In a securities claim investigation, the person preparing or defending a claim must: (1) prepare a profit and loss statement on
all securities transactions; (2) compile and collate all relevant files,
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including, but not limited to, the customer's written authorizations
for the trading in question, investment policies and internal rules
of a corporation or business organization, memoranda, correspondence, tax returns (Schedule D's), confirmations, and account
statements; (3) obtain from the firm the relevant records, including, but not limited to, account agreements (i.e., margin, discretionary, and option agreements, etc.), new account and account
qualification forms, order tickets, confirmations, statements of account, activity letters, risk exposure analyses, U-4 (inception) and
U-5 (termination) forms, pertinent entries in the SRO required option complaint log maintained by the branch office and the firm,
and RE-3 forms relating to personnel and claims history information; and (4) interview the customer and any of the people involved with the securities or the account in question, either on the
record or informally, if possible, or by subpoena, if necessary and
permitted by law. For instance in New York statutory law permits
discovery in aid of arbitration under "extraordinary
88
circumstances."
Traditional disclosure and exchange of information in securities arbitrations are described in the NASD Manual.89 The information that arbitration claimants and respondents can expect to
produce and receive is as follows:
From the Firm:
(1) RE-3s, U4s and U-5s of registered representatives
("RRs");
(2) Relevant parts of Compliance Manual;
(3) Client agreements and opening account documents;
(4) RRs' holding pages for customer and/or product;
(5) Commission run of RRs;
(6) Correspondence with regulators;
(7) Exception reports (i.e., activity concentration printouts);
(8) Order tickets;
(9) Marketing materials;
(10) Other customer complaints of a similar nature;
88 See DeSapio v. Kohlmeyer, 362 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (1974); Hendier & Murray,
P.C. v. Lambert, 511 N.Y.S.2d 941, 942 (App. Div. 1987); In re Application of Moock,
473 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794 (App. Div. 1984); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Wernick, 455 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31 (App. Div. 1982); International Components Corp. v.
Klaiber, 387 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (App. Div. 1976); Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. McCabe, 243 N.Y.S.2d 495, 499-500 (App. Div. 1963).
89 Code of Arbitration Procedure, reprinted in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. MIANuAL at 3701-30 (CCH) (1993).
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Redacted copy of holding pages of other customers in
the same product;
(12) Any analysis or account reconciliation prepared by the
firm;
(13) Notes or recordings made by the firm.
From the Customers.
(1) Income tax returns (can be limited to Form 1040 pages 1
and 2 and Schedules D and E);
(2) Customer copy of account statements;
(3) Statements for accounts at other brokers;
(4) Any analysis or account reconciliations prepared by the
customer;
(5) Notes or recordings made by the customer;
(6) Correspondence by claimant with the brokerage firm or
financial consultant.
There is a regrettable trend toward increasing, and often
needless, complexity in securities arbitration today. Many claimants' lawyers attempt to place the entire brokerage firm and its
general trading and sales practices on trial, rather than focus on
the real matters at issue. Often lawyers for the respondents, on the
other hand, will use various tactics to delay. Moreover, generally
speaking, as the number of arbitration claims filed each year at the
SRO's rises steadily, so do the stakes for all parties concerned.
Each side employs skilled attorneys, expert witnesses, and others
and makes extensive discovery demands upon the other. Steps
must be taken to continually reform and adapt the process of securities arbitration to take into account the changing needs of the
investment community and public. Clearly, in arbitration the
prime focus should be on the specifics of the dispute between the
customer and broker, what SRO rule violations occurred, and
whether those violations caused the actual losses complained of by
the customer. The task of policing the industry as a whole should
be left to the SEC, the SRO's, and the various states should be left.
Arbitration should be preserved as a means for the public customer to secure simple and expedient justice for a claim of securities malpractice.
(11)

V.

REFORM MEASURES

In light of the bulging arbitration caseload and often overaggressive lawyering, the NASD Legal Advisory Board (LAB) proposed an offer of judgment rule modeled after Rule 68 of the
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9" On October 20, 1993, the SEC
published the offer of award proposal for comment under SEC Release No. 34-33081.91 As proposed by the LAB, the rule would entitle the defending party to make an offer of settlement at any time
during the proceeding, up to several days before an arbitration
hearing. The rule further would have provided that, if the settlement offer is declined and the final award in arbitration is less than
the offer of settlement, the claimant would be required to reimburse the offeror for the costs incurred after the date of the offer
(including attorneys' fees and expert witness charges). This proposed rule was to have applied only to claims of $250,000 or more
(which includes about one-third of all arbitration claims). According to the NASD, the proposed rule would "encourage all parties to
92
evaluate and resolve cases in a timely and reasonable manner."
In the brief time since this offer of award proposal was published, it was subject to overwhelming criticism. In fact, due to the
substantial number of negative comments recieved, the SEC requested the NASD to consider withdrawing the proposal and, on
May 27, 1994, it was withdrawn.9 3 As of the date of publication of
this article, the NASD reported that it was reviewing possible revisions to the proposal with a view toward resubmission. 4
Critics of the original proposal argued that it encouraged
speedy settlements at the expense of equity. Concededly, an essential characteristic of arbitration is that it is a streamlined mechanism for dispute resolution and speedy settlements should no
doubt be encouraged. As many of the critics noted, however, settlement is an option prudently entered into only after one has
carefully weighed the pros and cons of the case, given all the available facts. Under the proposed rule a party could be forced to
engage in critical settlement negotiations before fully assessing his
or her case and without all the facts. Thus, while the spirit of the
NASD proposal is estimable (to make the arbitration process faster,
more efficient and more cost-effective), the risks of an imprudent
settlement are too great. A party should not be forced to accept a
settlement out of fear that he or she may be unfairly penalized by
having to pay fees and costs.
Whatever one's opinion may be concerning the withdrawl (al90 WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1993, at C1.
91 D. Masucci, Arbitration Update 1993, RESOLVING SECURITES DispuTES, Prentice

Hall Law & Business (A. Djinis and M. Fitterman co-moderators) (1994).
92 Id.
93 NASD Notice to Members 94-54, July 1994, p.3 2 0 .
94 Id.
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beit temporary) of the NASD's offer of award proposal, we enthusiastically support the efforts to improve the securities arbitration
system and procedures. Even more importantly, we urge that overriding interests ofjustice and equity be kept constantly in view. For
this reason, it is the strong opinion of the authors that the NASD
continue to explore new approaches and encourage further discussion so that any offer of award adopted be balanced and fair to all
arbitration participants, whether they be investors, associated persons or member firms.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The development and success of securities arbitration is compelling evidence that securities brokers have achieved professional
status. The securities industry has taken the lead in the beneficial
development of arbitration of professional liability claims and
should be properly recognized for this positive achievement. SRO
securities arbitration can serve as a model for the use of arbitration
in other contexts, such as for malpractice claims against lawyers
and accountants, and claims involving professionals and fiduciaries
in the banking industry. Further improvements can and must be
achieved, however.
Great care must be taken to ensure that securities arbitration
not be converted into civil litigation or be made increasingly complex. The beauty of arbitration is in its simplicity, its cost-effectiveness and its ability to resolve disputes fairly. This must be
preserved and protected.
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95
APPENDIX I-BASIC SRO RULES

NYSE

342. OFFICES-APPROVAL, SUPERVISION AND CONTROL
(b) The general partners or directors of each member
organization shall provide for appropriate supervisory control
and shall designate a general partner or principal executive
officer to assume overall authority and responsibility for internal supervision and control of the organization and compliance with securities' laws and regulations. This person shall:
(1) delegate to qualified principals or employees responsibility and authority for supervision and control of
each office, department or business activity, and provide
for appropriate procedures of supervision and control.
NYSE RULE 401. BUSINESS CONDUCT
Every member, allied member and member organization
shall at all times adhere to the principles of good business
practice in the conduct of his or its business affairs.
NYSE RULE 408. DISCRETIONARY POWER IN CUSTOMERS' ACCOUNTS
(a) No member, allied member or employee of a member organization shall exercise any discretionary power in any
customer's account or accept orders for an account from a
person other than the customer without first obtaining written
authorization of the customer.
(b) No member, allied member or employee of a member organization shall exercise any discretionary power in any
customer's account, without first notifying and obtaining the
approval of another person delegated under Rule 342 (b) (1)
with authority to approve the handling of such accounts.
Every order entered on a discretionary basis by a member, allied member or employee of a member organization must be
identified as discretionary on the order at the time of entry.
Such discretionary accounts shall receive frequent appropriate
supervisory reviews by a person delegated such responsibility
under Rule 342(b) (1), who is not exercising the discretionary
authority. A written statement of the supervisory procedures
governing such accounts must be maintained.
(c) No member or allied member or employee of a member organization exercising discretionary power in any customer's account shall (and no member organization shall
permit any member, allied member, or employee thereof exercising discretionary power in any customer's account to) efRULE

95 NYSE rules may be found in NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE (CCH) (1993).
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fect purchases or sales of securities which are excessive in size
or frequency in view of the financial resources of such
customer.
NYSE RULE 721. OPENING OF ACCOUNTS
(b) In approving a customer's account for options transactions, a member or member organization shall exercise due
diligence to learn the essential facts as to the customer and his
investment objectives and financial situation, and shall make a
record of such information which shall be retained in accordance with Rule 722 (Supervision of Accounts). Based upon
such information, the branch office manager or other Registered Options Principal shall approve in writing the customer's account for options transactions; provided, that if the
branch office manager is not a Registered Options Principal,
his approval shall be confirmed within a reasonable time by a
Registered Options Principal.

NYSE

RULE

722.

SUPERVISION OF

ACCOUNTS

DuTY TO SUPERVISE; SENIOR REGISTERED OPTIONS PRINCIPAL
(a) Every member organization shall develop and implement a written program for the review of the organization's
non-member customer accounts and all orders in such accounts, insofar as such accounts and orders relate to option
contracts. This program shall be under the supervision of a
general partner or officer of the member organization who is
a Registered Options Principal and who has been specifically
identified to the Exchange as the member organization's Senior Registered Options Principal.
COMPLIANCE REGISTERED OPTIONS PRINCIPAL

(b) Member organizations shall designate and specifically identify to the Exchange a Compliance Registered Options Principal, who may be the Senior Registered Options
Principal and who shall have no sales functions and who shall
be responsible to review and to propose appropriate action to
secure the member organization's compliance with securities
laws and regulations and Exchange rules in respect of its options business. The Compliance Registered Options Principal
shall regularly furnish reports directly to the compliance officer (if the Compliance Registered Options Principal is not
himself the compliance officer) and to other senior management of the member organization. ...
MAINTENANCE OF CUSTOMER RECORDS

(c) Background and financial information of customers
who have been approved for option transactions shall be
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maintained at both the branch office servicing the customers'
accounts and the principal supervisory office having jurisdiction over that branch office. Copies of account statements of
options customers shall be maintained at both -the branch office supervising the accounts and the principal supervisory office having jurisdiction over that branch for the most recent
six-month period. Other records necessary to the proper supervision of accounts shall be maintained at a place easily accessible both to the branch office servicing the customer's
account and to the principal supervisory office having jurisdiction over that branch office.
BRANCH OFFICE

(d) No branch office of a member organization shall
transact options business with the public unless the principal
supervisor of such branch office accepting option transactions
has been qualified as a Registered Options Principal; provided, that this requirement shall not apply to branch offices
in which not more than three Registered Options Representatives are located, so long as the options activities of such
branch offices are appropriately supervised by a Registered
Options Principal.
NYSE RULE 723. SUITABILITY
No member organization or member, allied member or
employee of such member organization shall recommend to a
customer an opening transaction in any option contract unless
the person making the recommendation has a reasonable basis for believing, at the time of making the recommendation,
that the customer has such knowledge and experience in financial matters that he may reasonably be expected to be capable of evaluating the risks of the recommended transaction,
and is financially able to bear the risks of the recommended
position in the option contract.
NYSE RULE 724. DISCRETIONARY ACCOUNTS
AUTHORIZATION AND APPROVAL REQUIRED

(a) No member, or allied member or employee of a
member organization shall exercise any discretionary power
with respect to trading in option contracts in a customer's account unless such customer has given prior written authorization and the account has been accepted in writing by a
Registered Options Principal. The Senior Registered Options
Principal shall review the acceptance of each discretionary account to determine that the Registered Options Principal accepting the account had a reasonable basis for. believing that
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the customer was able to understand and bear the risks of the
strategies or transactions proposed, and he shall maintain a
record of the basis for his determination. Each discretionary
order shall be approved and initialled on the day entered by
the branch office manager or other Registered Options Principal, provided that if the branch office manager is not a Registered Options Principal, his approval shall be confirmed
within a reasonable time by a Registered Options Principal.
Every discretionary order shall be identified as discretionary
on the order at the time of entry. Discretionary accounts shall
receive frequent appropriate supervisory review by the Compliance Registered Options Principal. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not apply to discretion as to the price at which
or the time when an order given by a customer for the
purchase or sale of a definite number of option contracts in a
specified security shall be executed.
OPTIONS PROGRAMS

(b) Where the discretionary account utilizes options programs involving the systematic use of one or more options
strategies, the customer shall be furnished with a written explanation meeting the requirements of Rule 791 (Communications to Customers) of the nature and risks of such
programs.
PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS

(c) No member or allied member or employee of a member organization having discretionary power over a customer's
account shall, in the exercise of such discretion, execute or
cause to be executed therein any purchases or sales of option
contracts which are excessive in size or frequency in view of
the financial resources in such account.
RECORD OF TRANSACTIONS

(d) A record shall be made of every transaction in option
contracts in respect to which a member or allied member or
employee of a member organization has exercised discretionary authority, clearly reflecting such fact and indicating the
name of the customer, the designation and number of the option contracts, the premium and the date and time when such
transaction was effected.
NYSE RULE 726.
OPTIONS DISCLOSURE DOCUMENT

(a) At or prior to the time a customer's account is approved for trading in a particular kind of option by a member
or member organization, such member or member organiza-
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tion shall deliver to the customer the applicable current Options Disclosure Document. Thereafter, such member or
member organization shall distribute a copy of each new
amendment to or revision of each applicable current Options
Disclosure Document to every customer having an account approved for trading the particular kind of option covered by
such applicable current Options Disclosure Document or, in
the alternative, shall so distribute such amendment or revision
not later than the time a confirmation of a transaction in such
particular kind of option is delivered to such customer.
PROSPECTUS

(b) Every member and member organization shall deliver a current Prospectus of The Options Clearing Corporation to each customer who requests one. The term "current
Prospectus of The Options Clearing Corporation" means the
prospectus portion of Form S-20 that meets the delivery requirements of Rule 153b under the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended.
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DATE

ACCOUNT NUMBER

Dear Client:
Thank you for opening an account with our firm. As an introduction, your initial transaction is usually in a security listed on the
NYSE or a Regional Exchange that we are currently
recommending.
As we build a relationship, we will usually recommend a security considered speculative in nature and may involve a high degree
of risk as well as a high degree of potential reward. These securities trade in the OTC market listed on the NMS or NASDAQ System and are usually quoted in the Wall Street JournaL
Prior to making an investment decision with respect to the
purchase of growth securities in a speculative context, prospective
investors should carefully consider their investment objectives and
their personal financial condition and should not purchase these
securities unless they are able to assume such risk while pursuing
such potential reward.
Young, Upstart & Successful Securities Broker-Dealer may be
the investment banker, dominant market maker in these securities,
and may be responsible for a large percentage of the average daily
volume. Additionally, at times, these securities may be less liquid,
and the ability to sell a large position may depend on the ability of
our firm to find a buyer. In consequence, the securities may trade
at prices which have less of a relationship to the securities' intrinsic
value than high-priced securities with more developed trading
markets.
At any given time, our firm may be the only firm writing a
research report and recommending the security.
We will be glad to provide you with written information from
our files (which usually consists of statutory prospectuses, quarterly
and annual reports, news releases and the like) concerning any
company whose securities you have purchased or are considering
purchasing through your account with us, on request.
We will also be sending to you the new account form containing pertinent data, which you have furnished to us concerning
your investment objectives and status, and we would appreciate
your signing this form where indicated to verify its accuracy. Please
also make and initial any corrections before returning it to us in
the self-addressed, post-paid envelope enclosed. We look forward
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to your establishing a relationship with our firm and to servicing
your account.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
YOUNG, UPSTART & SUCCESSFUL
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR TELEPHONE SOLICITATIONS
Telephone solicitations for the purposes of obtaining new accounts and/or for the purchase or investment in securities or in
services or other products offered by the Firm ("cold calling") may
be made only in accord with the following:
A. Cold calls may be made only after 8 a.m. and before 9 p.m.
(local time at the called party's location).
B. At the commencement of each cold call, the called party must
be given the name of the caller and the name, address and
telephone number of the Firm.
C. The Firm maintains a "Do Not Call List" in its main office.
Copies are available at all branch offices. The names of all
persons who have requested that no further calls be received
from the Firm or any of its employees are recorded on the
Firm's "Do Not Call List."
D. If a request by a party receiving a cold call is made not to receive any other calls from the Firm or its employees, including
the person making the cold call, that request, including the
called party's name and telephone number, must be immediately forwarded to the branch manager. The branch manager
will be responsible for ensuring that the party's name and telephone number are immediately placed upon the Firm's Do
Not Call List.
E. If an employee intends to use an automatic telephone dialing
system or an artificial or pre-recorded voice, or to use a fax
machine or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement
to a fax machine, that employee must first consult with the
compliance director. The compliance director will provide
the employee with specific procedures for making cold calls
utilizing such methods.
F. Upon the opening of an account for a customer who is new to
the Firm, the Firm will, as a matter of course, forward the attached letter to the new client.
G. All cold call contacts must be made in a professional manner,
i.e. the use of rude and abusive language is forbidden. Do not
terminate calls in an abrupt manner.
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APPENDIX III
MEMORANDUM OF ATTENDANCE AT COMPLIANCE
SEMINAR FOR YOUNG, UPSTART & SUCCESSFUL
SECURITIES BROKER-DEALER
The undersigned certifies by signing below that at 3:00 p.m.
on January 3, 1994, he/she attended a compliance seminar sponsored by the management of Young, Upstart & Successful Securities Broker-Dealer designed to inform its registered representatives
of important and continuing requirements in the conduct of business in the securities industry. The seminar lasted in excess of a
period of one hour and included guidance and instruction in the
following areas:
1. The need to recommend suitable investments was stressed.
In this connection, the elements of suitability were described as financial capacity, investment experience, investment objectives and
a general ability to fend for oneself in assessing and understanding
investments.
2. The requirements of the securities industry know-your-customer rule were emphasized. This rule was described as an essential underpinning of the suitability concept. It is vital that you
know your customer in terms of financial capacity, investment history and investment objectives in order that recommendations to
that customer will be suitable.
3. A third basic rule was stressed: that rule was that all recommendations which we, as brokers, make have a reasonable basis. By
reasonable basis is meant that there should be a solid and informed reason for making our recommendations. Said recommendations were described as relying on current and accurate written
information about companies. The sources of said information
were described as SEC filings, proxy reports, annual reports, prospectuses, investor letters, articles, communications from management and other varied information from the public media. We
were cautioned to realize that it is often in the interest of management to give glowing reports about the progress of companies and
that, in consequence, we are to make every effort to be accurate in
making factual presentations.
4. It was stressed that a securities market must be free and be
composed of willing buyers and willing sellers. In this connection,
it was further explained that an investor's desires and intentions
concerning his holdings are to be the paramount consideration in
the making of investment decisions.
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5. The prohibition against trading on insider information and
undisclosed non-public information was stressed; the recent developments on insider trading were discussed, and we were told of the
importance of dealing only in information that was both public
and had been widely disseminated to members of the investing
public.
6. The importance of communications with investors in the
sense of answering their queries, getting back to investors who call
in, servicing their complaints and referring those complaints to the
proper compliance officials in the company was also stressed.
7. The need for prospectuses and proper disclosure on public
offerings was another of the subjects that we reviewed; the important role of the preliminary prospectus was described and the absolute necessity that a final prospectus accompany any sale was
explained.
8. The NASD Proscription on free riding was also discussed.
This concerns the placing of family members, nominees or anyone
acting in our stead in securities which we anticipate will have a
rapid price rise immediately upon the opening of the stock.
These were among the key issues covered in the seminar/lecture that we attended. Emphasis throughout was laid on the fact
that it is the interests of investors that come first and that those
interests are to be served before considerations of our commission
income or other earnings come into play.
I acknowledge by signing below that each of these various propositions outlined above were discussed and that it was stressed
that I take every opportunity to learn all of these standards and
adhere to them; in conclusion, it was emphasized that unless these
rules are carefully and continuously kept in mind and followed, we
are not doing our jobs as brokers.
Dated:

Wall Street City, USA
January 3, 1994

x
(Print name clearly beneath signature line)

